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Introduction
Many countries have recently adopted or reformed social pension programs to better support the needs of the elderly. Improved understanding of the income-health gradient may lead to the development of more effective pension programs as well as retirement policies.
Although the income-health gradient has long been an important topic of investigation, existing research is not conclusive. While early studies found a strong income-health gradient (Marmot 1994) , few incorporated a study design that would demonstrate a causal relationship (Marmot 2002; Deaton 2002) . Findings also conflict. For instance, Snyder and Evans (2006) find that higher pension income leads to higher mortality, while others find that higher pension income leads to better health status (Case 2001) and lower mortality (Jensen and Richter 2004) .
The literature on income-mental health gradient is more scant. This paper provides novel evidence on the causal impact of pension provision on mental well-being.
Mental health is an important component of overall health status. Mental disorders are among the most common causes of low quality of life, disability and death (Byers et al. 2012 ) and account for a large share of lost disability-adjusted life years and therefore the overall global burden of disease (Collins et al. 2011 ). In addition, mental health plays an important role in maintaining physical health (National Research Council and Institute of Medicine 2009). The rapid aging of the world population further raises the importance of improving mental health at older ages, because older adults have both high rates of mental illness (WHO 2017) and among the highest suicide rates of all age groups (Case and Deaton 2015; US CDC 2016).
Credibly establishing a causal pathway between income and mental health has proven difficult. First, there is concern over reverse causality. If the gradient arises primarily because of causal pathways from mental health to income (i.e., good health leads to higher productivity and income), then strategies directly targeting health behavior may be most effective. If, on the other hand, the gradient arises primarily because higher income causes improvements in mental health, policies that make economic resources available may be most efficient in promoting mental health.
Second, unobserved factors, such as genes or social trust, may affect both income and mental health, leading to biased estimates.
Although LMIC Populations have more than twice the rate of depressive symptoms, mood disorders, and anxiety disorders compared to their U.S. counterparts (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 1999; Byers et al. 2010) , the literature on the causal impact of income on mental health, especially in the elderly, has been limited to the developed country context (Golberstein 2015) . However, more than 80 percent of the world's 2 billion older individuals will be living in low-and middle-income countries (LMICs) by 2050 (Suzman et al. 2014 ) and investment in mental illness prevention and treatment remains low in LMICs (Collins et al. 2011) .
This paper provides some of the first causal evidence of pension provision on mental health in the developing context.
In attempts to identify the causal impact of income on mental health, studies have used quasi-experimental study designs and examined the effects of a financial crisis (Friedman and Thomas 2008) , moving to higher living standards (Stillman et al. 2009 ), job displacement (Sullivan and Wachter 2009) , winning the Nobel Prize (Rablen and Oswald 2008) , lottery winning (Apouey and Clark 2015) , and receiving an inheritance (Kim and Ruhm 2012) . However, the mental health consequences of some of these events can be confounded by changes in other covariates unrelated to income per se. People who purchase lottery tickets may demonstrate quite different risk preferences than the general population, which may threaten the generalizability of the findings. Moreover, this causal interpretation also relies on the strong assumption that lottery success is not directly correlated with mental health. People who receive inheritance have presumably lost a loved one, which may also affect mental health, a potential violation of the exclusion restriction. Also important for policymakers, , most studied shocks are in the form of a lump-sum transfer, which may affect mental health differently than an annuity, due to a violation of fungibility (Thaler 1990 ).
To overcome these issues, a few studies explore exogenous changes in income, such as the German reunification for East Germans (Frijters et al. 2005) , the New Jersey-Pennsylvania Negative Income Tax Experiment (Elesh and Lefcowitz 1977) , the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) in the U.S. (Evans and Garthwaite 2014), the Child Benefit System in Canada (Milligan and Stabile 2011) , and the Social Security Notch (Golberstein 2015) . However, while some of the existing studies find positive causal linkages between income and mental health, many fail to find compelling evidence (Frijters et al. 2005; Adda et al. 2009; Stowasser et al. 2011) , and a few even report small negative effects (e.g. Snyder and Evans 2006) .
In this paper, we consider the largest pension program in the world -China's New Rural Pension Scheme (hereafter NRPS). Our identification strategy relies on the fact that the program had a staggered rollout (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) , with residents of some counties enjoying earlier eligibility and pension receipt. Government documents indicate counties were randomly chosen for earlier implementation (State Council of China 2009), an assumption we test explicitly in this paper using a rich set of countylevel variables.
We use the 2012 China Family Panel Studies (hereafter CFPS), which contains the 20-item full version of Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale (CES-D) (Radloff 1977) . The CES-D is a comprehensive measure of mental health and enables us to measure changes in a continuous measure of mental health as well as dichotomous changes in depressive symptoms.
We construct two samples for our analysis: one consisting of older persons (ages 60 plus) who are eligible to claim pension benefits, and the other comprised of younger adults (ages 45-59) who are eligible to contribute to subsidized pension account, but do not yet receive pension payments. Our results suggest that pension enrollment generates modest to large improvements in mental health for the former group, but the latter group experiences no such benefit. These effects hold under a set of robustness checks, falsification tests, and IV estimations with individual fixed effects (IV-FE). We find the impact is unevenly distributed. Specifically, pension disproportionally improves mental health of those in relatively worse mental health status, and in the lower segment of socioeconomic status (measured by educational attainment and income).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the institutional details of the NRPS. Section 3 discusses our conceptual framework for this analysis; Section 4 describes the data and the estimation strategy. Section 5 presents results.
Finally, section 6 concludes the study and discusses policy implications.
China's New Rural Pension Reform
Against the backdrop of rapid economic growth, increasing life expectancy and a declining fertility rate (following the introduction of the One-Child Policy in the 1970s) has led to an acceleration of demographic aging in China. However, prior to 2009, there was little formal social safety net for the rural elderly population. To provide a more robust system of old-age support, in 2009 China launched a pension program for rural residents. By 2012, the NRPS covered more than four hundred million rural residents, among whom almost ninety million were greater than 60 years of age. The NRPS benefit contains two components: a noncontributory (or basic) pension and an individual account (based on individual contributions with government matched subsidy). Both are paid to participants when they reach age 60.
However, enrollees age 60 or above at NRPS rollout had no option for an individual account, limiting them to only receive the basic pension.
The basic pension financed solely by the government is available to all enrollees at age 60 (Chen et al. 2017a) . While the NRPS was rolled out at the county level, the level of basic pension is set at the provincial level. Many provinces set 55 CNY (or around 9 USD) per month as the basic pension benefit, although a few wealthier provinces (e.g., Beijing, Tianjin) set the benefit at up to 360 CNY (or around 60 USD) per month. The government fully finances all basic pension benefits.
Regarding the individual (or contributory) account, according to the guidance released by the State Council of China, there are five categories of premiums for individual accounts: 100, 200, 300, 400, and 500 CNY per year per person. While some provinces offer additional higher levels of individual premiums, a majority of participants choose to contribute 100 CNY per year per person, the lowest level of pension premium (Lei et al. 2013) . The financing of the pension benefits comes in part from a government subsidy of 30 CNY per person per year for the first 100 CNY of individual premiums contributed to the individual account; there is a lower than proportional subsidy for additional individual premiums contributed.
At the time of the roll-out, the provisions for the individual account differed by age. Adults below age 45 at NRPS rollout must contribute to the individual account for at least 15 years to be eligible to receive benefits drawn from the individual account at age 60 (of course, they would be eligible for the basic pension conditional on making these contributions). Those age 45-59 at NRPS implementation may contribute for any (positive) length of time to be eligible for the individual account benefit.
Total pension benefits, including basic pension and a possible individual account, are approximately 15 percent of China's average earned income. Thus, the NRPS offers a modest payment compared to many other developing countries, such as South Africa (Lund 2007) .
As previously noted, NRPS was rolled out gradually. According to the official document No. [2009] 32 (State Council of China 2009), the central government attempted to randomly select counties for pilot implementation without any written criteria. In our empirical testing, we look for evidence that county government selfselected into pilot implementation or its roll-out timing based on a rich set of observable characteristics and find none. As described in the official documents released by the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security, the first implementation group adopted in September 2009, and covered roughly 10 percent of counties; the second implementation started in August 2010, and increased the proportion of counties participating to 25 percent; the third group implemented since July 2011 with 60 percent of all counties covered. By the end of 2012, all counties had adopted the program. Figure 1a indicates roll-out timing at the county level.
The NRPS may demonstrate heterogeneous impacts due to large socioeconomic inequality. For example, pension payment accounts for more than half of the income per capita for a household in the lowest 10 th income percentile in China (Cai et al. 2012) . That older individuals typically earn much less than younger individuals also may lead the NRPS to generate a larger impact, especially in regions that are lagging behind in economic growth (Chen et al. 2017b ).
Conceptual Framework
The determinants of mental health are complicated, involving socio-economic and physical environments at different stages of life (WHO 2014). In our context, mental health has been found to be associated with socioeconomic status (e.g. marital status, education, income) and physical health (e.g. chronic disease) for the aging population in China (Lei et al. 2014; Li et al. 2014; Qin et al. 2018) . Special attention should be paid to income as it not only affects mental health directly through investments in mental health but indirectly via other socioeconomic factors and physical health conditions. The Grossman model of health capital (1972a, 1972b) provides a conceptual basis for analyzing the relationship between income and mental health. The model makes a clear conceptual distinction between inputs in mental health production and mental health outcomes. Even if mental health inputs are normal goods, so that increases in income cause a rising quantity of input demanded, the net effect of increased income could be negative if income elasticity with respect to unhealthy goods (e.g. unhealthy behaviors and lifestyle) is sufficiently high.
It is worthwhile to think about channels through which pension may affect mental health investment and health outcomes and, in particular, which of these channels are likely to apply to the Chinese context studied here. Grossman's framework suggests that pension payments to the older cohort (those age 60 or greater) may affect mental health through at least three plausible channels: (i) changes to lifestyle factors, such as independent living, service consumption, leisure time, and connectedness with friends and communities; (ii) health investments, such as nutritional intake and medical treatment; and (iii) economic security leading to reduced financial stress. (Wong et al. 2012 ) and limited capacity to treat mental illness in China (The Economist 2017) results in a low fraction (8%) of Chinese with mental illness being treated (Xiang et al. 2012 ).
Therefore, we expect the health investment channel is mainly indirect, i.e. through better nutrients intake and treatment for physical health conditions that, in turn, improve mental health. Recent studies on the NRPS show that pension promotes use of appropriate health care services, adherence to recommended treatment plans (Chen 2017; Chen et al. 2017b) , and nutritional intake (Cheng et al. 2018b) , with no apparent increase in unhealthy behavior, including smoking and alcohol drinking (Cheng et al. 2018b ).
Third, pension income may improve mental health through channel (iii), i.e., reduced psychosocial stress and adverse moods associated with financial hardship as well as increased self-esteem and sense of control (Fernald and Gunnar 2009; Baird et al. 2013) . While recent studies of the NRPS demonstrate higher probability of having sufficient financial support for daily expenses (Cheng et al. 2018b ), more empirical studies are required to directly test mental stress in response to pension benefits.
For enrollees not yet eligible for pension benefits (those younger than age 60), knowing that their own contributions to the individual account are matched by sizable government subsidies may reduce fear of future financial problems due to a strong commitment to saving for older ages and therefore serve to improve mental health through channel (iii). Grossman's framework predicts that even channels (i) and (ii) may yield some benefits for the younger cohort if they predict future pension income can lead to less disability and longer life expectancy, resulting in changes in current investment decisions. On the other hand, these potential beneficial effects can be muted by their premium payment (i.e. loss of income).
Methods

Data
We use We consider all adults 45 years of age and above with rural registration (N=8,636) and divide into two distinct groups (ages 45-59 versus ages 60 and above) in our analysis. As noted above, at ages 45-59 individuals may pay a pension premium (i.e., a loss of current income), while at ages 60 or above individuals receive a monthly payment. We therefore expect the effects of pension enrollment to differ for these two age groups. While people below age 45 are required to contribute for at least 15 years to be eligible for NRPS, those age 45-59 at rollout may choose to contribute for any duration of time. We therefore would expect different effects by age.
The CFPS survey collected rich information at the individual level, the household level, and the community level, including demographic characteristics, socioeconomic status, NRPS enrollment, mental health status (as measured by the CES-D), and subjective well-being (SWB). The CES-D, originally developed by Radloff (1977) , is one of the most common screening tests for the depression quotient of individuals.
Among all Chinese national survey datasets, CFPS uniquely contains a standard 20-item CES-D measure for mental health conditions during the past week. These 20 questions describe a list of feelings, including 16 questions on negative feelings and 4 questions on positive feelings. The respondents were asked to indicate how often they had those feelings or behaviors from the four options -"almost never (less than one day)", "sometimes (1-2 days)", "often (3-4 days)", and "most of the time (5-7 days)".
The four options correspond to 0, 1, 2, 3 in negative questions and 3, 2, 1, 0 in positive questions. The possible total score ranges from 0 to 60. In addition to total CES-D score, we consider a binary indicator -depressive symptoms -which is often used to diagnose depression. An individual is diagnosed with depression symptoms if the CES-D total score is greater than 15 (Radloff 1977; Bailly et al. 1992) . Figure 2 indicates the range and distribution of CES-D scores in the 2012 CFPS and suggests that a substantial proportion of respondents (36%) suffer from depressive symptoms.
Estimation Strategy
The relationship between pension enrollment and mental well-being can be identified in the following equation:
where i Y denotes mental health. τ identifies the effect of The key empirical challenge in identifying the causal effect of the pension (or more generally income) on mental health is that income changes can be endogenous.
First, mental health may have a non-negligible impact on income. Second, unobserved factors omitted from the model, such as character, life experiences and social network, may affect both mental health and income and therefore can bias our estimations.
To avoid reverse causation and omitted variable bias and obtain unbiased and The computational method we use to identify our IV estimates is two-stage leastsquares (2SLS). The corresponding first stage equation of the 2SLS estimations is: Similarly, though the younger cohort were not receiving pension income shortly after enrollment, many of them were expected to receive the payment in the near future, especially for those who were closer to the age 60 eligibility cutoff.
To be a valid instrument, (Table   A1 and Table A2 ) bolsters our confidence that NRPS timing is not independently correlated with mental health (except through pension enrollment). Table 1 shows descriptive statistics of pension status, mental health, and covariates in the analysis. Comparing pension enrollees and non-enrollees, the former on average reported better mental health status in both older and younger cohorts.
Empirical Results
Main Results
Meanwhile, the gap in mental health between pension enrollees and non-enrollees is larger for the older cohort than for the younger cohort. Next, we conduct more rigorous regression analyses to disentangle the effect of pension from other confounders. Our main results presented in Table 2 through Table 6 are limited to people age 60 and above, while the results for the younger cohort are in the Appendix.
In the first stage estimation we examine the correlation between county-level pension roll-out duration and individual pension enrollment, including the likelihood of pension enrollment (Table 2 & Table A5 ) and pension benefit size (Table 3) .
Results for the older cohort (age 60 and above) indicate that one additional month of pension roll-out increases the probability of enrollment by 1.2 percentage point (Table   2 column 1) and pension income by 1.7 CNY (Table 3 column 1) . As expected, results indicate enrollment was slower among individual between age 45 and age 60 who were required to deposit money into their individual account upon enrolling. Results presented in Table A5 (column 1) show that one more month of pension roll-out increases enrollment rate by 0.7 percentage point in the younger cohort. As stated in the notes to the regression tables, the first stage F-statistics for the instrumental variable are above the usual threshold value for strong IV (i.e. 10), and most of them are above 80. Therefore, the NRPS duration at the county level is strongly positively correlated with individual pension enrollment status and (for those already above age 60) pension income. Consistent with Cheng et al. (2018a) , these results indicate that duration of pension rollout at the county level is a strong instrument for both pension enrollment and pension benefits.
In the second stage, the effects of pension enrollment (Table 2 ) and pension income (Table 3) The effects of pension on younger enrollees are shown in Table A5 . Although enrolling in pension may help the participants ensure against risks in old ages, the effects of NRPS are insignificant in the IV estimations and smaller in size than the effects on the older cohorts. On average, enrolling in the NRPS decreases CES-D score by 2.705 in the IV estimation. The rate of depressive symptoms decreases by 9.4 percentage points.
Robustness
In this section, a series of robust checks are described to provide reassurance that the main estimation results hold, especially for the older cohort.
First, we consider the subsample of urban residents who have no rural registration and therefore are ineligible to enroll in the NRPS. If the impact of pension enrollment is causal, and not driven by confounding factors, we should find no effect for these urban residents. As there is no actual pension enrollment for urban residents, we use a reduced form model and test the direct impact of NRPS rollout duration. We find the impact is nearly zero and insignificant for both the older and younger cohorts (Table A6) Table 4 shows that for the older cohort pension enrollment is associated with 11.8 and 16.8 percentage points decline in CES-D score and the rate of depressive symptoms, respectively. This magnitude is similar to the main results presented in Table 2 and Table A5 .
Heterogeneous Effects
In this section, we discuss the heterogeneous effects of pension on mental health of older persons by mental health status, income, education, marriage status and the mental health measure. First, Table 5 shows results from the IV-quantile regression (IVQR) models. Except at the 10 th quantile of the CES-D score, the point estimates are larger for higher quantiles (or worse mental health status).
Second, pension payment may account for a larger share of income for the poor, leading to heterogeneous impacts by income. We divide the sample of older cohort by income. Though the effects are less precisely estimated due to the smaller sample size,
Panel A of Table A8 shows that pension enrollment and pension income mainly improve mental health of the lower income groups. This result indicates that pension benefits may release binding financial constraints for the poor segment.
Third, nearly one third of the rural respondents in the CFPS national sample are illiterate or semi-illiterate, defined as not completing primary education. To determine whether the effects we find differ by educational background, we divide the older cohort sample into three groups, including individuals who are illiterate or semiilliterate, who completed only primary education, and those who completed secondary education. Panel B of Table A8 shows that pension income is the most effective in reducing depressive symptoms for the least educated group, which is consistent with recent evidence in the U.S. (Ayyagari 2015).
Fourth, it is likely that families with couples both receiving pension may benefit more than others with one member receiving pension simply due to the doubling benefits. We divide the older cohort (age 60+) sample into two subsamples: single or married with spouse under age 60, and married with spouse over age 60. Note the number of married older persons with a spouse under age 60 are too small to perform 2SLS estimations separately so we group them with single older persons. This categorization enables us to distinguish the married couple both above age 60 from those with only one receiving pension benefit. However, Panel C of Table A8 does not indicate that families with more pension beneficiaries experienced larger effects,
suggesting that pensioners do not use the income in such a way as to benefit their spouses.
Finally, looking into the results for each specific item of CES-D may help better understand potential mechanisms. Table 6 to test these two questions available in both waves. Consistently with Table 6 , results
in Table A11 suggest that pension enrollment improves the response to "I felt depressed" more than response to "I felt hopeless".
Conclusions and Discussion
The NRPS offers a modest but potentially important source of income to older populations in China. Employing a well-designed IV strategy, this paper provides new The NRPS achieved universal coverage at the county level in 2012, thus providing a nationwide, subsidized old-age support system to the older population in rural China. Since then, China has been rapidly implementing a social pension program for all eligible urban residents and has set an ambitious plan to integrate the rural and urban social pensions into one system, establishing a national pension system with the goal of providing wide coverage, basic security, multi-level options and sustainability. Once completed in 2020, this unified pension system is expected to serve more than 800 million residents in China. Our future work includes evaluating this more comprehensive and growing pension system. (1994) and Zhang et al. (2012) . However, the results should be treated with caution since the CES-D in Andresen et al. (1994) and Zhang et al. (2012) has same total score but different number of items compared to CFPS 2010.
[3] The covariates are the same as in Table 2 except age.
[4] ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. [2] F-statistics for "NRPS duration at the county level" in the first stage are respectively 240.25 and 87.51 for NRPS enrollment and NRPS income.
[3] The covariates are same as in Table 2 .
[4] ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors are reported in the parentheses. (4, 8, 12, 16) , so that they have the same sign as those negative questions. 0 represents the best situation, 3 represents the worst situation.
[2] The covariates are same as in Table 2. [3] ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors clustered at the county level are reported in the parentheses. Table 2. [3] ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors clustered at the county level are reported in the parentheses. Table 2. [4] ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors clustered at the county level are reported in the parentheses. [3] Net transfer (in CNY) is defined as the size of net transfer from parents to all non-resident children in the past year. Financial support (0/1) is defined as whether providing financial support to children in the past 6 months.
Online Appendix
[4] The covariates are same as in Table 2. [5] ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors clustered at the county level are reported in the parentheses. Notes:
[1] The CES-D question "I felt hopeless" in CFPS 2010 is phrased as "I felt hopeful about the future" in CFPS 2012. We therefore reversed the response scale in 2012 to match with the corresponding question in CFPS 2010.
[2] The covariates are same as in Table 2 .
[3] ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors are reported in the parentheses.
